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INTRODUCTION 
1. This submission is a response to the ‘Call for Submissions by the Parties in Cases 003 
and 004 and Call for Amicus Curiae Briefs’ by the Co-Investigating Judges, which seeks 
clarification on whether, under customary international law applicable between 1975 and 
1979, an attack by a state or organisation against members of its own armed forces may 
amount to an attack directed against a civilian population for the purpose of Article 5 of the 
ECCC Law. 
 
2. Our position is that an attack in such a situation can constitute an attack under Article 
5. We shall show this primarily through an examination of the case law following World War 
Two, in order to establish customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979. 
We shall also consider recent developments in modern international criminal courts. We have 
three main arguments: 
 
1. Customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979 recognised 
persecution on political, racial or religious grounds as a crime against humanity 
regardless of whether the victims were considered civilians; 
2. Customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979 recognised 
that members of the armed forces could constitute civilians for the purposes of crimes 
against humanity, where the crimes occurred in a systematic manner in line with a 
state policy; and 
3. International criminal law continues to acknowledge that attacks against 
members of the armed forces may amount to crimes against humanity. 
 
PERSECUTION AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
3. Under the Nuremberg Charter1 and Control Council Law No. 10,2 crimes against 
humanity are defined as: 
 
… murder, extermination enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, 
rape or other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population or 
                                                          
1
 UN, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, Article 6(c). 
2
 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against 
Humanity, 20 December 1945, Article II. 
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persecution on political, racial or religious grounds, whether or not in 
violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.  
 
4. It can be seen that the second category contains no reference to a civilian population. 
This distinction has been widely recognised within the post-World War Two jurisprudence, 
which has identified two categories of crimes against humanity: i) acts against civilian 
populations, and ii) persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds.   
 
5. In relation to the second ground, case law supports the conclusion that in a situation 
where the state is engaging in inhumane acts and persecution on political, racial, or religious 
grounds, there is no requirement that the victims be civilians.
3
 As stated in the French Cour 
de Cassation Barbie decision: 
 
it is the intention of the perpetrator of the crimes and not the quality or 
motives of the victims that determine the nature of the persecution committed 
… neither the victims’ motives nor their classification as combatants could 
exclude the guilty intent giving rise to Crimes against Humanity which shall 
be prosecuted… Crimes against Humanity include inhumane acts and 
persecutions committed in a systematic manner against people belonging to a 
particular race or religious community in the name of the State which is 
carrying out its policy of ideological hegemony … including inhumane acts 
and persecutions committed against adversaries of this policy, no matter 




This position subsequently received support from the Cour d’appel de Paris in the Touvier 
case, where it was found that: 
 
Jews and members of the Resistance persecuted in a systematic manner in the 
name of a state practising a policy of ideological supremacy, the former by 
reason of their membership of a racial or religious community, the latter by 
                                                          
3
 Case No. 35 (The Justice Trial: Trial of Josef Altstötter and Others), UNWCC, 30 November 1947; In re Pilz. 
Holland, District Court of The Hague (Special Criminal Chamber), 21 December 1949; Special Court of 
Cassation, 5 July 1950. 
4
 Jean-Olivier Viout. (1999) ‘The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes against Humanity’ Hofstra Law & Policy 
Symposium 3: 155-166. 
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reason of their opposition to that policy, can equally be the victims of crimes 
against humanity.
5
   
 
6. Such crimes can be perpetrated by the state against the state’s own nationals. For 
example, in Josef Altstötter and Others, it was noted that ‘acts by Germans against German 
nationals may constitute crimes against humanity’. 6 Indeed, it has been observed that ‘the 
concept of crimes against humanity was introduced chiefly with a view to punishing offences 
committed against nationals of the enemy States themselves, such as in the case of German 
Jews, German Catholics and other Germans victimised on account of their race, religion or 
political creed.’7 
 
7. Support for a focus on persecution, regardless of the status of the victim, comes from 
the 1947 Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, which focused predominantly on the 
existence of persecution. Its Resolution, drafted by some of the ‘best jurists in the world’,8 
proposed a definition of crimes against humanity which removed the concept of ‘civilians’, 
and instead specified that: 
 
Any manslaughter, or act which can bring about death, committed in peace 
time as in war time, against individuals or groups of individuals, because of 
their race, nationality, religion or opinions, constitutes a crime against 




8. In his recent commentary on the customary international law of crimes against 
humanity, Cassese noted that as ‘no mention is made of the possible victims of persecutions, 
or rather, as it is not specified that such persecutions should target “any civilian population”, 
the inference is warranted that not only any civilian group but also members of the armed 
forces may be the victims of this class of crime.’10 He concluded that: 
 
                                                          
5
 Republic of France v Paul Touvier, Cour d’appel de Paris, 13 April 1992, 352. 
6
 Josef Altstötter and Others, n.3. 
7
 Notes on Trial of Wilhelm Gerbsh, The Special Court in Amsterdam, First Chamber, 28 April 1948, Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals (Vol. XIV) (Forward). 
8
 Joseph Y. Dautricourt (1949-1950). ‘Crime Against Humanity: European Views on Its Conception and Its 
Future’ Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 40: 170. 
9
 Resolution of the VIII Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, Brussels, 10th and 11th July, 1947. 
10
 Antionio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2
nd
 ed) (Oxford University Press, 2008), 118. 
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Plainly, in times of peace military personnel too may become the objects of 
crimes against humanity at the hands of their own authorities. By the same 
token, in times of armed hostilities, there is no longer any reason for 
excluding servicemen, whether or not ford de combat (wounded, sick, or 
prisoners of war), from protection against crimes against humanity (chiefly 





9. We acknowledge that Article 5 does not contain a distinction between acts against 
civilians and persecution. However the Article’s inclusion of ‘on national, political, ethnical, 
racial or religious grounds’ retains the goal of prosecuting persecution, and should therefore 
be interpreted as including inhumane acts perpetrated against members of the armed forces 
based on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds. 
COMBATANTS AS ‘CIVILIANS’ 
10. The first category of offences under the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law 
No. 10: ‘acts against civilian populations’, were initially intended to refer to persons other 
than combatants. However, after World War Two courts began to adopt a liberal 
interpretation of the term ‘civilians’,12 with courts focusing instead whether the crimes were 
conducted in a systematic manner in line with a state policy.  
 
11. For example, in the case of R. (StS 19/48),13 the Supreme Court for the British 
Occupied Zone found that denouncing a non-commissioned officer in uniform and member 
of the Nazi Party and the SA for insulting the leadership of the party could constitute a crime 
against humanity, as long as it could be demonstrated that the agents intention was to hand 
over the victim to the ‘uncontrollable power structure of the party and State’, knowing that as 
a consequence, the victim was likely to be caught up in an arbitrary and violent system.
14
 
Similarly, in P. and others, five members of a Court Martial were found guilty of complicity 
in a crime against humanity for their role in executing three German marines who tried to 
escape from Denmark following Germany’s partial capitulation. The Court noted that: 
 
                                                          
11
 Ibid, 122. 
12
 Ibid, 118-119. 
13
 Case of R. (StS 19/48), Supreme Court for the British Occupied Zone, 27 July 1948 
14
 Ibid, 47. 
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Whoever notes the expressly emphasized illustrative character of the 
instances and classes of instance mentioned there [Article II(1)(c) of the 
Control Council Law No.10], cannot come to the conclusion that action 
between soldiers may not constitute crimes against humanity. [Admittedly], 
a single and isolated excess would not constitute a crime against humanity 
pursuant to the legal notion of such crimes. [However], it has already been 
shown that the action at issue can belong to the criminal system and criminal 




In the H. case, the same Court found that a judge who had sentenced to death two officers of 
the German Navy could be held guilty of crimes against humanity to the extent that his action 
was undertaken deliberately in connection with the Nazi system of violence and terror.
16
 The 
Cour de Cassation took a similar approach in Barbie, overruling the lower court’s finding that 
Barbie could not be charged with crimes against humanity perpetrated against Professor 
Gompel, because it was ‘not clear whether Professor Gompel has been arrested in his 
capacity as a Jew or in his capacity as a member of the Resistance.’ The Court found that: 
 
Whereas, what constitutes crimes imprescriptible against 
humanity…[includes] the inhumane acts and the persecutions which, in the 
name of a State practicing a hegemonic political ideology, have been 
committed in a systematic fashion, not only against persons because they 
belong to a racial or religious group, but also against the adversaries of this 
[State] policy, whatever form their opposition…and whereas neither the 
mental intent of the victims, nor the possibility that they were combatants, 
could exclude the existence, on the defendant’s part, of the mental intent 
required for the infraction pursued, the Indicting Chamber has 
misunderstood the scope and meaning of the law.
17
   
 
Thus, the status of victims of crimes against humanity has repeatedly been found to be 
irrelevant, where the crimes were perpetrated in the context of states practising hegemonic 
political ideologies enforced through arbitrary and violent systems. To the extent that such 
                                                          
15
 P. and others, Germany, Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone, 7 December 1948, 228. 
16
 H. case, Germany, Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone, 18 October 1949, 233-234, 238, 241-4. 
17
 Leila Sadat Wexler (1994-1995). ‘The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of 
Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again’ Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 32: 289-380, 342. 
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incidences would satisfy the widespread and systematic requirement, Article 5 of the ECCC 
could be broadly interpreted, allowing for members of the armed forces to be victims of an 
attack for the purposes of the Article.  
FROM CIVILIANS TO HORS DE COMBAT  
12. While not directly relevant to the status of customary international law between 1975 
and 1979, it is worth noting that subsequent jurisprudence does not exclude members of the 
armed forces from being considered victims of crimes against humanity. Although 
contemporary courts have not addressed the specific issue considered in this submission, 
some guidance can be found in their jurisprudence on similar issues.  
 
13. The International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have 
opined that a ‘targeted   population   must   be   of   a predominantly   civilian   nature. The   
presence   of   certain   non-civilians   in   their   midst   does   not change the character of the 
population’.18 This is asserted in Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, where the ICC held that, 
‘the crime may be established even if the military operation also targeted a legitimate military 
objective. It is important, however, to  establish  that  the  primary  object  of  the  attack  was  
the  civilian  population  or individual  civilians’.19  
 
14. However, the jurisprudence from these tribunals has been consistent in stating that, 
‘there is no requirement nor is it an element of crimes against humanity that the victims of the 
underlying crimes be ‘civilians’”.20 In Prosecutor v. Kupreškíc the ICTY held that, ‘those 
actively involved in a resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against 
humanity’,21 and in the Prosecutor v Mrkšić and Šljivančanin case, the appeal chamber 
overruled the trial chamber’s holding that the underlying victims of a crime against humanity 
must be civilian, stating that the trial chamber had erroneously created an additional 
requirement.
22
 Indeed, recent case law suggests that these tribunals are adopting a broad 
                                                          
18
 The Prosecutor v Tadić (IT-94-1-T) 7 May 1997, para 638; The Prosecutor v Blaškić (IT-95-14-A) 29 July 
2004, para 114-115; The Prosecutor v Kordić & Čerkez (IT-95-14/2-A) 17 December 2004, para  50 and  97;  
The Prosecutor v Galić, (IT-98-29-A) 30 November 2006, para 136-137; The Prosecutor v Akayesu (ICTR-96-
4-T) 2 September 1998, para 582,  n. 146; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05 -01/08) 21 
March 2016, para 153; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07) 7 March 2014, para, 802. 
19
 Katanga, ibid, 802. 
20
 The Prosecutor v Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, (IT-95-13/1-A) 5 May 2009, para 32; The Prosecutor v Popović et 
al. (IT-05-88-A) 30 January 2015, para 773; Bemba, n.18, para 155. 
21
 The Prosecutor v. Kupreškíc (IT-95-16-T) 14 January 2000, para. 549. 
22
 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, n.18, para. 33. 
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interpretation of the term ‘civilian’, which incorporates hors de combat. At the ICTR, it was 
held that the reliance on combatant/civilian distinction from international humanitarian law 
and war crimes misapplies the nature of crimes against humanity. For example, in the 
military cases where 10 Belgian peacekeepers were captured by the Rwandan army, beaten 
and executed, it did not matter that one of them had obtained a weapon to use in self-defence 
before they were killed, as it did not change their vulnerable status and the attack against 
them forming part of a larger crime against humanity.
23
 The question of whether they were 
civilians or not was irrelevant, instead the focus was on whether they could be classified as 
combatants or not.  
 
15. As such, it can be seen that the tribunals have acknowledged that looking at the 
distinction as between combatants and civilians does not capture all hors de combat. When it 
comes to crimes against humanity, hors de combat (as a more adaptive reading of civilians) 
better encapsulates the underlying vulnerability and egregiousness of crimes where hors de 
combats are massacred on masse. Accordingly victims of crimes against humanity are not 
‘unified metaphysical entities’, but a group of identified individuals who are vulnerable from 





16. This brief submission has established that from 1975-1979, customary international 
law recognised that members of armed forces could be subjected to crimes against humanity, 
in cases where they were subject to persecution, and in cases where the crimes were 
perpetrated on behalf of a broader state policy through structures of violence. Such crimes 
could be perpetrated by states against their own nationals. While more recent case law has 
considered that the victims of crimes against humanity must be predominantly civilian, it 
does not exclude members of armed forces from being considered victims, and indeed begins 
to show a broad interpretation of the term ‘civilian’. 
 
17. M. Cherif Bassiouni has identified the modern law on crimes against humanity as 
containing two common features: 
                                                          
23
 The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al. ( ICTR-98-41-T) 18 December 2008, paras.2175 and 2239; and 
Prosecutor v Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Bizimungu, François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, Innocent Sagahutu 
(ICTR-00-56-T) 11 May 2011, paras. 2095-96 and 2140. 
24
 David Luban (2004). ‘A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity’ Yale Journal of International Law 29:1, 85-
167, 97. 
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(1) they refer to specific acts of violence against persons irrespective of 
whether the person is a national or non-national and irrespective of whether 
these acts are committed in time of war or time of peace, and (2) these acts 
must be the product of persecution against an identifiable group of persons 
irrespective of the make-up of that group or the purpose of the persecution. 
Such a policy can also be manifested by the ‘widespread or systematic’ 
conduct of the perpetrators, which results in the commission of the specific 




18. Thus, it can be seen that the customary law of crimes against humanity does not 
preclude attacks against armed forces from constituting such crimes. Criminalisation of 
crimes against humanity arose to protect individuals who are left vulnerable to abuses from 
those in power.
26
 More symbolically these crimes penalise the egregious disregard for human 
spirit, life, integrity and dignity that shocks the conscious of humanity.
27
  An interpretation of 
Article 5 which allows an attack by a state or organisation against members of its own armed 
forces to amount to an attack directed against a civilian population is in keeping with the 
overall purpose of international criminal law and international humanitarian law, to promote 
a broad scope of protection of the basic values of human dignity, regardless of the legal status 
of those entitled to such protection.
28
 As such, the breadth of the ‘civilian population’ 
requirement becomes a lower threshold to establish when construed against other elements in 
the chapeau of the crime. 
 
                                                          
25
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ available at www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/crimes-
against-humanity/#sthash.aOwRmBrM.dpuf 
26
 Luban, n.24, 101 fn.59. 
27
 Hansdeep Singh (2009). ‘Critique of the Mrkšić Trial Chamber (ICTY) Judgment: A Re-evaluation on 
Whether Soldiers Hors de Combat Are Entitled to Recognition as Victims of Crimes Against Humanity’ The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 8, 247-296. 
28
 See Kupreškíc et al., n.21, pars. 547–549; Prosecutor v Jelisíc (IT9510T) 14 December 1999, para. 54. 
